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Terrorism: The International Response of the Courts*
THE HONORABLE JUSTICE MICHAEL KIRBY AC CMG**
I. A CENTURY OF TERRORISM
The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, of October 12, 2002
in Bali, and during 2004 in Madrid, Breslan, and Jakarta, have brought home to
the world the challenge that acts of terrorism present when combined with new
means of causing destruction and of enlivening the capacity of the global media
to cover the suffering.
However, terrorism is not new. The last century was a century of terrorism.
It was not always so perceived. Yet from the early days-from the anarchists and
communists in 1901 through the colonial unrest that followed, right up to the
new century we have entered-that was the reality. The Great War began in
1914 with an act of terrorism. The reality struck home within the British Isles in
the Easter Rebellion in Dublin in 1916. Not a year of the century was free from
acts of terror.
Mahatma Gandhi deployed a very skillful combination of passive resistance,
sporadic violence, and political showmanship, ultimately to lead India, the jewel
in the Crown, out of British rule. Mohammed All Jinnah did the same with Pa-
kistan, obliging the division of the subcontinent that has since witnessed unrest
and terrorist acts as a consequence. Over many decades (most of them in prison
on Robben Island), Nelson Mandela led the African National Congress (ANC),
modeled on that of India. For decades the ANC was branded a "terrorist" orga-
nization. What did these three leaders have in common? All were lawyers.' All
*Text for a lecture at Indiana University-Bloomington, Indiana on September 21, 2004 for
the Institute of Advanced Study. I wish to express my thanks to the Institute and Professor Alfred
Aman for the invitation to deliver this paper as a Branigin Lecture.
**Justice of the High Court of Australia. Member of the Board of the Kinsey Institute, Indi-
ana University. I acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Alex de Costa, legal researcher to the High
Court of Australia for some research for this lecture. See also Justice Michael Kirby, Address at the
Opening Plenary Session of the Australian Legal Convention of the Law Council of Australia, Can-
berra, 21 AUSTL. BAR REV. 253 (2001).
1. Raymond B. Marcin, Gandhi andJustice, 7 LoGos: J. CATH. THOUGHT & CULTURE, Summer
2004, at 21. There are many recent suggestions concerning earlier manifestations of terrorism. See
Primitive Terrorists, ECONOMIST, July 31-Aug. 6, 2004, at 72 (suggesting that pirates who attacked
Spanish barques in the 17th century were "primitive terrorists" in their time).
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were gifted communicators. Gandhi and Mandela, at different times, were even
prisoners in the same jail, near where the Constitutional Court of South Africa
now proudly stands in the center of Johannesburg.
Other "terrorist" movements were led by people who refined their skills on
the battlefield-Mao Tse Tung, General Giap, Ho Chi Minh, Colonel Boum&
dienne, Gamel Abdel Nasser. As the old European empires crumbled, terrorists
struck at their quarry. They did so against the new autocratic Nazi and Soviet
empires and were repaid with fearsome reprisals. They did so against the rela-
tively benign British Empire in Palestine, Kenya, Malaya, Aden, Cyprus, and
elsewhere. They attacked the faded glories of France in Algeria and Vietnam.
The new empires that took the place of the old were then themselves attacked,
as in East Timor, Chechnya, Kosovo, and West Irian. Terrorists mounted sepa-
ratist campaigns in Northern Ireland and Quebec. Successive coups in Fiji de-
ployed unconstitutional and violent means. Bougainville, the Solomons, and
East Timor came uncomfortably close to collapse. Indonesia has repeatedly
fallen victim to suicide bombers of Jemaah Islamiah. Russia has suffered re-
peated violence, much of it apparently caused by Chechnyn separatists.
In my youth, I followed the Cyprus campaign of General Grivas. He was a
commander of no more than 250 EOKA terrorists with extreme nationalist
sympathies, demanding union with Greece. Those few ultimately drove 28,000
British troops from the island by destroying their political capability to wage
war.2 The fate of the French in Algeria was similar. The same has not proved
true in Northern Ireland. Whereas the "colons" in Algeria constituted only 2
percent of the population, the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in that
country had a common interest in forcing their increasingly desperate and vio-
lent French rulers to leave.3 Eventually they succeeded. In Northern Ireland,
there always were, and still are, substantial numbers in both communities who
found continuing connection with the United Kingdom acceptable and terror-
ism unacceptable.4
The story of Uruguay is particularly instructive. Before 1974, it was one of
the few longstanding, stable constitutional democracies of Latin America. In
1967 it adopted a new and stronger constitution. That document incorporated
2. See Andrew Mack, The Utility of Terrorism, 14 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 197, 201
(1981).
3. See id. at 202-03.
4. Id. at 207.
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impeccable rule of law and human rights principles. But then Uruguay suffered
a serious economic downturn which threatened its welfare laws. At the same
time, it had to grapple with a challenge from a small, determined band of terror-
ists known as the Tupamaros. The Tupamaros resorted to indiscriminate acts of
violence and cruelty that shook Uruguayan society. The citizens, and especially
the military, began to demand solutions. Coups had occurred in Brazil in 1964,
in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Chile in 1973. In Uruguay, in 1974,
the military, police, and their supporters struck.
After the coup, one by one, the constitutional guarantees in Uruguay were
dismantled. More than 5,000 civilians in a country of fewer than three million
inhabitants were incarcerated for very long prison terms for having committed
"political offenses." Other detainees were kept incommunicado. For a time ha-
beas corpus was withdrawn. Immunity was granted to officials for an increas-
ingly broad range of illegal acts. The country that had been known as the
"Switzerland of Latin America" 5 entered a period of escalating lawlessness. At
first, the strong governmental tactics had much support in the general popula-
tion because of fear of the Tupamaros. However, unaccountable power eventu-
ally bred oppression. True, the Tupamaros were defeated. But it took twelve
years and an enormous struggle to return Uruguay to constitutionalism.6 Even
then, amnesties were imposed for the military, police, and other officials. A deep
scar was left on the body politic.
In Australia's region of the world, we have, until recently, had nothing like
the threats of terrorism in Cyprus, Algeria, Northern Ireland, or Uruguay. Nat-
urally, everyone wants to keep it that way. Nevertheless, at the Commonwealth
Heads of Government Conference in Sydney in February 1978, a bomb was det-
onated and three people were killed. The Bali bombing on October 12, 2002 also
led to soul-searching over the suggested failure of Australian officials to alert
tourists about a terrorist risk. Yet one of the most notable consequences of Bali
was a close and highly professional cooperation between the Indonesian police
and Army and the Australian Federal Police. This was followed by outstanding
forensic support provided for in the trial of those accused of the Bali offenses.
That cooperation was revived following attacks by suicide bombers on the Aus-
tralian Embassy in Jakarta on September 9, 2004.
5. Id. at 223.
6. Robert Kogod Goldman, Uruguay: Amnesty Law in Violation of Human Rights Convention,
49 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 37,38 (1992).
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After the bombing in Sydney in 1978, the shock led to what one analyst
called "[a] synthetic panic which gripped the government (and was exploited by
the media) .... Leading officials "accepted without question the assumption
that ... [there] was a real and present [terrorist] threat to Australia."8 Subse-
quent events showed that this was wrong. Following the more recent attacks on
Bali and Jakarta, there was less panic-just pain and grim resolution.
The 1978 bombing in Australia led to inquiries9 and new legislation. Jus-
tice Robert Hope, the Royal Commissioner, found that there was little evidence
that Australia's security organizations had the qualities of mind necessary for
what he called the "skilled and subtle task" of intelligence assessment." This was
an unsurprising conclusion to those in the know. Earlier inquiries into the spe-
cial branch files of state police in the Australian states of New South Wales and
South Australia-the latter conducted by Justice Michael White' 2-found ludi-
crous biases in the identification of the supposed threats to security. According to
Justice White, all state leaders of the Australian Labor Party automatically be-
came the subjects of index cards as suspected "subversives." As he put it, "[l ike
the Maginot Line all defences against anticipated subversion, real or imagined,
were built on one side."'"
This course of conduct reflected, in the antipodes, preoccupations similar to
those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States, where the ratio
of files on left- versus right-wing people and organizations was a hundred to
one. 4 The Police Commissioner of South Australia at the time defined subver-
sion as "a deliberate attempt to weaken public confidence in the government."'"
Yet, in a constitutional democracy, this is exactly what opposition parties are
supposed to do, do all the time, and are doing in the United States and Australia
in the current election campaigns. The criticisms of the Australian intelligence
services twenty-five years ago, and more recently, bear comparison with the con-
7. RICHARD HALL, THE SECRET STATE 115 (1978).
8. Id. at 118 (quoting Sir Robert Mark, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police).
9. E.g., ROBERT MARSDEN HOPE, PROTECTIVE SECURITY REVIEW REPORT (1979) (examining anti-
terrorism preparedness in Australia).
10. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act, 1979 (Austl.).
11. Mack, supra note 2, at 220 (quoting HOPE, supra note 9).
12. M. White (Commissioner), Special Branch Security Records, at 33 (1977).
13. Id. at 52.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 107.
TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE OF THE COURTS 317
temporary criticism of those services by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence 6 and the Butler Inquiry in Britain. In Australia, a report has been
given on the same subject by Mr. Philip Flood with roughly similar results. This
wheel, it seems, must repeatedly be reinvented.
So if we ask why terrorism succeeded in Cyprus and Algeria, had only lim-
ited success in Northern Ireland and Quebec, and failed abysmally in Italy, the
United States, and Australia and its region (to the extent that it has occurred
there), the answers are complex. However, answers there are. The most impor-
tant answer is that those societies that have succeeded best against terrorists have
refused to play into the terrorists' hands. They have rejected the terrorist para-
digm. As Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins has pointed out, normally
"[tierrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot
of people dead."' 7 They want publicity, the last thing that most perpetrators of
nonpolitical violence seek. Terrorists create a symbiotic relationship with the
modern media. They initiate media events. Kidnappings, hijackings, behead-
ings, suicide bombs, and a thousand windows shattered in an embassy building
display elements of high tension, as does indiscriminate brutality. s
The media in free societies must, and will, cover such events. Indeed, the
electronic media is now particularly well adapted to broadcasting vivid images,
with sights of death and suffering. But keeping such visual horror in perspective
is an important clue to defeating terrorists at their game. So is keeping one's
sense of balance and priority. So is analyzing the reasons that may lie behind acts
of terror, to decide if some of them reflect grievances that need to be addressed.
According to Justice Hope's Australian review in 1979, 1,652 deaths could
be attributed to international terrorism between 1968 and 1977.'9 Such losses, ap-
palling though they are (and worse still when they are multiplied as they have
lately been), pale into insignificance beside other global causes of death and suf-
fering such as the twenty million dead and many more dying of HIV/AIDS,
dead due to the general indifference of humanity. Millions, mostly in developing
countries, dying from tobacco use and its consequences. From malaria. From
16. See generally SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 108th CONG., U.S. INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. No. 108-301 (2d Sess. 2004).
17. BRIAN JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW MODE CONFLICT 3 (1975). See also Is
There an Effective Democratic Deterrent to Terrorism?, PARLIAMENTARIAN, Oct. 1996, at 325.
18. Mack,supra note 2, at 217.
19. HoPE, supra note 9, at 18.
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lack of water and food. Millions dead in state-run wars. Millions in refugee
camps. Anonymous dead and living. Few vivid images. Boring reality. No
media interest. No news. Relatively little political appeal. Victims of compassion
fatigue.2" As the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the BBC
during the recent conference on AIDS in Bangkok: "We hear a lot about terror-
ism, and we are warned about weapons of mass destruction because of their po-
tential to kill thousands of people. Here we have an epidemic that is killing
millions. We really do need leadership. 21
The thesis of this lecture is that the countries that have done best against ter-
rorism are those that have kept their appreciation of priorities, retained a sense
of proportion, questioned, and where possible, addressed the causes of terror-
ism, and adhered steadfastly to constitutionalism and the rule of law.
11. INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE COMMUNISTS
Fifty years before September 11, 2001, the Australian Constitution received
what was probably its most severe test in peacetime. The enemy then was
viewed as a kind of global terrorist and widely hated. This enemy's ideas were
subversive. Its methods were threatening and its goals alarming. I refer to the
communists. The communists did not fly commercial aircraft into buildings in
crowded cities. Nor did they use suicide bombers to threaten civilian popula-
tions. But they did indoctrinate their young. They had many fanatical adher-
ents. They divided the world. They were sometimes ruthless and murderous.
They developed huge stockpiles of nuclear and biological weapons. They had a
global network. They opposed our form of society.
Out of fear, governments around the world rushed to introduce legislation
to increase powers of surveillance and deprivations of civil rights. In South
Africa, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 became, before long, the
mainstay of the legal regime that underpinned apartheid and imprisoned Nel-
son Mandela and the ANC "terrorists." In Malaya, Singapore, and elsewhere,
the colonial authorities introduced the Internal Security Acts, which is what the
20. See generally SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE: How THE MEDIA SELL DISEASE,
FAMINE, WAR, AND DEATH (1999).
21. Stephen Scott, One Night in Bangkok-Addressing the Global AIDS Crisis, SX NEWS, July 22,
2004, available at http://sxnews.com.au.
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South African Act was also later called. Sadly, many of those laws remain in
place, long after independence, to oppress those of dissident opinions.
In the United States, the Smith Act was passed by Congress to permit the
criminal prosecution of members of the Communist Party for teaching and ad-
vocating the overthrow of the government.22 The law was challenged in the
courts of the United States. The petitioners invoked the First Amendment guar-
antees of freedom of expression and assembly. However, in Dennis v. United
States,23 the Supreme Court of the United States, by majority, upheld the Smith
Act. It held "there was a sufficient danger to warrant the application of the
statute ... on the merits."
24
Dissenting, Justice Black drew a distinction between governmental action
against overt acts designed to overthrow the government and punishing what
people thought, wrote, and said. 25 The latter activities, he held, were beyond the
power of Congress. Also dissenting, Justice Douglas acknowledged the "popular
appeal" of the legislation. 26 However, he pointed out that the Communist Party
was of little consequence and no real threat in the United States:
Communists in this country have never made a respectable or se-
rious showing in any election. I would doubt that there is a village,
let alone a city or county or state, which the Communists could
carry. Communism in the world scene is no bogeyman; but Com-
munism as a political faction or party in this country plainly is.
Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that
it has been crippled as a political force. Free speech has destroyed
it as an effective political party.27
A few months after Dennis was decided, a similar challenge came before the
High Court of Australia. In Australia, there was no First Amendment. There
was no established jurisprudence on guaranteed free expression and assembly.
Most of the judges participating in the case had no political experience whatso-
22. Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670-76 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (2000)).
23. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., for the Court).
24. Id. at 511.
25. See id. at 579.
26. Id. at 581.
27. Id. at 588.
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ever. Most of them were commercial lawyers whose professional lives had been
spent wearing black robes and a head adornment of horsehair. An Australian
contingent was fighting communist forces in Korea.28 The Australian govern-
ment had a popular mandate for its law. Most Australians saw communists as
the bogeyman-indeed their doctrine of world revolution and the dictatorship
of proletariat was widely viewed as a kind of political terrorism.
Chief Justice Latham, like his counterpart in the United States, upheld the
validity of the Australian anti-communist law. He quoted Cromwell's warning:
"Being comes before well-being." 9 He said that his opinion would have been the
same if the Parliament had legislated against Nazism or Fascism. However, the
rest of the High Court of Australia rejected the law.3" Justice Dixon pointed out
that:
History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries
where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally su-
perseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the execu-
tive power .... [T]he power to legislate for the protection of an
existing form of government ought not to be based on a concep-
tion ... adequate only to assist those holding power to resist or
suppress obstruction or opposition or attempts to displace them or
the form of government they defend."'
So far as Justice Dixon was concerned, it was for the courts to ensure that
suppression of freedom was only imposed within the law. The Constitution af-
forded ample powers to deal with overt acts of subversion. Responding to a
hated political idea and to the propagation of that idea was not enough for the
validity of the law.
Given the chance to vote on a proposal to change the Australian Constitu-
tion to confer powers over communists and communism, the people of Austra-
lia, on September 22, 1951, refused to alter it. When the issues were explained,
they rejected the proposed enlargement of federal powers. I believe that history
28. Michael D. Kirby, H V Evatt, the Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia, 12
AUSTL. BAR REV. 93, 95 (1992).
29. Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 141 (Latham,
C.J., dissenting).
30. Australian Communist Party, 83 C.L.R. at 143.
31. Id. at 187-88.
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accepts the wisdom of the response in Australia and the error of the overreaction
in the United States.
32
Keeping proportion. Adhering to the ways of democracy. Upholding consti-
tutionalism and the rule of law. Even under assault and even for the feared and
hated, defending the legal rights of suspects. These are the ways to maintain the
support and confidence of the people over the long haul. Judges should not for-
get these lessons. In the United States, even in dark times, the lessons of Dennis
and of Korematsu3" need to be remembered. 4 Every erosion of liberty must be
thoroughly justified. Sometimes it is wise to pause before acting. As Professor
Bruce Ackerman has proposed, if the need for emergency powers is clearly es-
tablished, it may be appropriate to subject them to a sunset clause-so that they
expire when the clear and present danger passes.3" The answer that should nor-
mally come back from judges, as in Australia in 1951, is: judicial business as
usual; human rights upheld; the rule of law maintained.
III. OLD AND NEW LAWS AGAINST TERRORISTS
Laws specifically targeted at the risks of violence perpetrated by enemies,
including foreign enemies, are by no means new. In 1939, the U.K. Parliament
enacted the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act of that year to
deal with a campaign of the Irish Republican Army in the context of a new Eu-
ropean war.36 That law was ultimately allowed to expire, an event described as
"an act of faith without contemporary parallel."3
32. M.H. McHugh, The Strengths of the Weakest Arm, Keynote Address to the Australian Bar
Association Conference (July 2, 2004), available at http'//www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/
mchughj_2july04.htmI (last visited Nov. 11, 2004); see also Al-Kateb v. Godwin, 78 A.L.J.R. 1099,
1128 (Austl. 2004) (citing McHugh's keynote address to reject the executive's assertions of self-
defining and self-fulfilling power).
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,219 (1944). In that case, the majority of the Supreme
Court upheld as lawful the detention of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War.
34. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What the Supreme Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs,
Aug. 12, 2004, at 26-29 (discussing Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)).
35. See Bruce Ackerman, Sunset Can Put a Halt to Sunlight of Liberty, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2001, at B15.
36. Clive Walker, Terrorism and Criminal Justice: Past, Present, and Future, CRIM. LAW REV., May
2004, at 311.
37. Id.
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There followed in Britain a number of laws responding to the violence in
Northern Ireland. These laws included the Northern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Acts of 1973-98, the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of
1998, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts in continu-
ous use between 1974 and 2001. The counter-terrorism laws of the United King-
dom were reviewed by a judicial inquiry reported in 1996 by Lord Lloyd and Sir
Michael Kerr.38 The response to their report was the Terrorism Act of 2000
which came into force in February 2001.
However, in many countries, it was the events of September 11, 2001 that
triggered the passage of enactments designed to put the authorities into a better
legal position to deal with terrorist events and, hopefully, to prevent them. In the
United Kingdom, Parliament enacted the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act of 2001. Police powers were enlarged by the Criminal Justice and Police Act
of 2001 and later laws.
The proliferation of this legislation has led to fragmentation of the criminal
law. It has resulted in a derogation by the United Kingdom under Article 15 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and in the adoption of intrusive
surveillance measures. One commentator, who acknowledged fully the need for
special and extra powers, concluded:
[T]he alternative to the war model is still an extensive security
State, with increasing focus on surveillance and financial scrutiny
and approaches indicative of risk management and prevention
rather than prosecution. There is no final victory in the war
against terrorism. Equally, in an asymmetric conflict, the terror-
ists cannot destroy western polities, but they may be able to pro-
voke western polities to destroy their own spirits.39
In Australia, since 2001, several antiterrorism laws have been enacted.4" In
fact, seventeen items of legislation restricting civil freedoms have been proposed
38. See generally INQUIRY INTO THE LEGISLATION ON TERRORISM, 1996, Cm. 3420 (U.K.).
39. Walker, supra note 36, at 327.
40. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act 1979 (Austl.) was amended
by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Austl.). Among powers afforded to the ASIO is
one of detention under conditions that forbid any public disclosure of the detention for up to 28
days (s 34 VAA) and a two-year prohibition on publishing "operational information." ASIO's
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to the Federal Parliament. Most of them have been enacted.4' In addition, state
legislation has been enacted to complement national laws.42 There is a tendency in
this area to give legislation stirring names in the hope of rendering exceptions to
civil liberties more palatable and opposition more difficult. In Australia, we have
not gone so far as calling such legislation a "Patriot Act."43 But the media have no-
ticed the Orwellian character of some of the titles, such as the New South Wales
Freedom of Information (Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence) Act of 2003,
whose object is to restrict access to official information on security grounds.44
Most of the Australian legislation, like much elsewhere, has been enacted
without significant parliamentary opposition. This caused an editorialist in the
Sydney Morning Herald to remark in April 2004:
A Government statement breezily suggests that the law 'protects
the community' by restricting people from obtaining security-
sensitive information under freedom of information laws. But
long experience of the way state and federal governments have
perverted the intent of Fol statutes suggests that the agencies will
seek to prevent anything they regard as inappropriate from seeing
the light of day regardless of whether it may relate to inappropri-
ate behaviour or even budgetary overruns.... No one doubts that
there exists a deeply troubling threat to orderly society by some fa-
natical individuals and organisations. But who within the two
major Australian political parties is raising his or her voice about
the importance of balancing the perceived need for more draco-
nian measures with the equally important preservation of civil
liberties? Law enforcement and intelligence agencies habitually
powers of detention have been enlarged while the entitlements of the media and suspects' lawyers
curtailed. See Michael Head, Another Threat to Democratic Rights, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 127 (2004).
Cf. A. v. Hayden (1984) 156 C.L.R. 532 (stating that the constitutional validity of such laws has not
been tested).
41. The most important of these are the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2004 and the Australian Secu-
rity Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Act of 2003.
42. Press Release, Federal Attorney General of Australia, Reference of Terrorism Powers (Mar.
27, 2003). See Head, supra note 40, at 130; Duncan Kerr, Australia's Legislative Response to Terror-
ism, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 131,133 (2004).
43. See generally Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3 (2004) (dis-
cussing how the realm of criminal procedure has changed since the events of September 11, 2001).
44. Standing Up for Liberties, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 13, 2004, at 12.
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want greater powers and licence to manoeuvre with only the min-
imum of legal constraint or legislative oversight. Liberals of the
small "I" variety seem silent within the Liberal Party, apparently
bowed and unprepared to break with the prevailing political or-
thodoxy that too much toughness is not enough. The Labor Left,
the traditional campaigner against too much police power, is also
strangely quiet.4"
In such an environment, the last line of defense for human rights, funda-
mental freedoms, and individual liberty tends to be the courts.46 In contempo-
rary democracy, in the matter of antiterrorist legislation, the usual protections
and balances may not always be available either in the legislative process or in
executive enforcement. Nations that are minor players in the global "war on ter-
rorism" sometimes come under international pressure that they cannot resist to
adopt counterpart laws. Necessarily, the courts have only a limited role. Their
duty is to give effect to any laws that are constitutionally valid. They must do so
according to the language of the legislation and in order to achieve its presumed
purpose.47 However, courts are not without lawful and proper means, in some
respects, to ensure against an excess of legislative or executive action.
In many countries, such as the United States, where a challenge is brought,
courts can evaluate legislative provisions against the standards of a national con-
stitution and bill of rights. Even in countries like Australia that do not have an
entrenched charter of rights, courts are not bereft of legal means to uphold fun-
damental civil rights. In appropriate cases, they may apply settled principles of
statutory interpretation that require that laws depriving individuals of long-
45. Id. In a 2003 letter to the Australian Federal Attorney-General, Mr. Ruddock, the main
media proprietors' group warned against the dangers of secrecy inherent in the legislation. The
Law Council of Australia also warned of such dangers. See Head, supra note 40, at 129; Bob
Gotterson, LegalArm Straitjacketed, LAW. WKLY. (Austl.), July 16, 2004, at 12, available at httpi/
www.lawyersweekly.com.au/articles/a6/0c0252a7.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). Contra Philip
Ruddock, Securing Civil Liberty, LAW. WKLY. (Austl.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 10, available at http'I/
www.lawyersweekly.com.au/articles/27/0C025227.asp?Type= 56&Category =844 (last visited Nov.
19, 2004) (arguing that the new laws are a necessary and proportionate response to a real ongoing
threat).
46. Simon Bronitt, Constitutional Rhetoric v. Criminal Justice Realities: Unbalanced Responses to
Terrorism?, 14 PuB. L. REv. 76 (2003).
47. Bropho v. Western Australia (1990) 171 C.L.R. 1, 20; Minister for Immigration & Multi-
cultural & Indigenous Affairs v. B. (2004) 78 A.L.J.R. 737, 768.
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standing and basic rights must be clear and without ambiguity.48 As well, there
is an increasing realization within the courts of Commonwealth countries that
national laws should ordinarily be construed to conform to the developing inter-
national law of human rights.49
In recent and not so recent times, in several countries, the judiciary has
shown a willingness to ensure the protection of fundamental freedoms, even in
the age of antiterrorist legislation. In the balance of this lecture, I will refer to
some of these cases.
IV. TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Irish Cases
Before the onset of the most recent coordinated terrorist attacks in Western
countries, specific groups in a number of European countries (the United King-
dom, Ireland, West Germany, Italy, and Spain) presented challenges to the legal
order that had to be considered in domestic courts and, subsequently, in the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights at Strasbourg.
The decisions of these bodies, created by the European Convention on
Human Rights ("the Convention"), have sought to steer a course between assur-
ing to terrorist suspects, equally with other human beings, the protections stated
in the Convention while acknowledging the necessity, on occasion, for national
laws to adopt exceptions that take into account the special challenge that terror-
ists pose to democratic societies and their institutions.
50
48. See, e.g., Jumbunna Coal Mining Assoc. v. Victorian Coal Miners' Assoc. (1908) 6 C.L.R.
309, 363-64; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 287;
Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth (2003) 211 C.L.R. 476, 492; Daniels Corp. Int'l Pty v. Aus-
tralian Competition & Consumer Comm'n (2003) 213 C.L.R. 543, 553.
49. See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1,42; Baker v. Canada [19991 2 S.C.R.
817, 861; Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1994] N.Z.L.R. 257, 266; Vishaka v. Rajasthan A.I.R.
1997 S.C. 3011, 3014-15 (India). But cf A1-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 78 A.L.J.R. 1099, 1110-15; id.
at 1127-35 (Kirby, J. concurring).
50. Colin Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism,
32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 118 (1983) (arguing that although there must be a balance between
states' rights and individuals' rights to deal with terrorism, it should be left to the states to strike
this balance, rather than to the Convention).
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Several early cases in the European system related to the antiterrorism leg-
islation of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Some of the deci-
sions concerned the extent to which contracting states could lawfully derogate
from the rights expressed in the Convention so as to permit them to adopt mea-
sures considered necessary to combat what they described as the challenge of ter-
rorism.5 Article 15 of the Convention permits such derogations in specified
cases. But they are not at large. A country cannot derogate by measures that are
inconsistent with other obligations under international law.52 And no deroga-
tions may be made from specified provisions of the Convention Articles. 53
In Lawless v. Republic of Ireland [No. 3],54 the European Court of Human
Rights was concerned with a case in which an Irish citizen had been detained
without trial for five months in 1957 on the basis of his alleged activities as a
member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The derogation and subsequent
measures for detention of the prisoner were upheld by the European Court. The
Court concluded that the Irish government was justified in declaring a public
emergency and acting as it did.55
Between 1957 and 1975, the U.K. government, likewise, gave notice of der-
ogation on six occasions pertaining to the use of extrajudicial powers to deprive
suspects of liberty for interrogation, for detention, and as a preventive measure.
Without derogation, such measures would have contravened Article 5 of the
Convention which guarantees the rights of liberty and security of the person. On
a complaint by Ireland, 56 the European Court found various impermissible
breaches among the U.K. measures-most especially in regard to the failure to
preserve access to judicial review for persons in detention.5" Some of the contra-
ventions were held to be within a permissible derogation. But in regard to in-
51. See Jeremie J. Wattellier, Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 397, 405-08 (2004).
52. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. XV § 1, Eur. Consult. Ass., Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/egal
echrtext.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
53. See, e.g., id. art. II (right to life), art. III (prohibition on inhuman treatment and torture), art.
IV § 1 (prohibition on slavery and servitude), art. VII (retroactive laws).
54. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1961).
55. Id. at 32.
56. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
57. Id. at 87-90.
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stances of inhuman treatment, which were found, derogation was not permitted
by the Convention. To this extent, the complaint by Ireland was upheld.58
In later cases concerning detention of IRA suspects, the European Court
noted that "the growth of terrorism in modern society" necessitated "a proper
balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common in-
terest and the protection of individual rights."59 The Court took notice of "the
existence of particularly difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland, notably the
threat posed by organised terrorism."6 Nevertheless, it upheld complaints of de-
tainees who asserted that their detention by British authorities for four days and
six hours fell "outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by [the Conven-
tion].' 1 Later, the United Kingdom increased the legal period of detention to
seven days which was said to be necessary to maintain the "fight against terror-
ism." It lodged a formal derogation. Again, the detainees complained to the
Court in Strasbourg. However, a majority of the European Court held that,
given the circumstances then prevailing in Northern Ireland, it was not appro-
priate to substitute a judicial opinion for the measures deemed appropriate or
expedient by the national government.62 The law was upheld as sufficiently con-
forming to the Convention, within a lawful derogation.
Further challenges under the Convention concerned the question of who bore
the onus of establishing justification of the reasonableness of the measures adopted
by a national government to combat terrorism. In an earlier decision, Brogan v.
United Kingdom,63 the European Court had effectively held that the onus was on
the complainant to demonstrate unreasonableness. However, subsequently in Fox
v. United Kingdom, the European Court concluded that "the respondent govern-
ment ha[s] to furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the
Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed the
alleged offence."' By a majority of four judges to three, the Court held in the latter
case that the United Kingdom had not discharged that onus. It was therefore in
breach of Article 5(l) of the Convention. Compensation was ordered.65
58. Id. at 107.
59. Brogan v. United Kingdom, I 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 129 (1988).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 135-36. The reference is to Art. 5 § 3 of the Convention.
62. Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 574-75 (1993).
63. Brogan, II Eur. H.R. Rep. at 129.
64. Fox v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 169 (1990).
65. Id. at 157.
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B. The German Cases
In late 1977, a series of terrorist incidents came to a head in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Although Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof had been ar-
rested in 1972 by the national police (and Ms. Meinhof had committed suicide in
her cell in 1976), a series of kidnappings and bombings took place between 1975
and 1976 allegedly carried out by members of the Baader-Meinhof Group (or
Red Army faction).
In October 1977, a Lufthansa flight was commandeered by members of the
Group demanding the release from prison of Mr. Baader and an associate. The
hijacking was brought to a violent end. The prisoners, including Andreas
Baader, meanwhile were found dead in their cells, allegedly following suicide.
The Group thereupon proceeded to kidnap and then execute the- President of
the German Employers' Association, a man with minor past associations with
the Nazi Party. A number of suspected members of the Group were rounded up.
The legislation used by the German authorities to respond to the foregoing
incidents included powers, enacted in 1968, permitting interception of telephone
calls and mail of suspects. Proceedings were commenced in the European Court
to challenge the German laws against the standards of the Convention.6 Again,
the European Court took judicial notice of "the development of terrorism in
Europe in recent years. '67 The court held that it was reasonable for democratic
states "to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating
within its jurisdiction." 6 In such circumstances, telephonic and mail interception
was held compatible with the fundamental rights contained in the Convention.
Earlier, a challenge against the fairness of their trial had been brought by
Andreas Baader and his colleagues in Ensslin v. Germany.69 After the deaths of
the applicants, the proceedings were maintained by their families.7' They as-
serted that the prisoners had been subjected to torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment and blamed the death of the prisoners on their
conditions. A specific complaint was made about solitary confinement of the
prisoners over an extended period.
66. Klass v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1978).
67. Id. at 232.
68. Id.
69. Ensslin v. Germany, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 418 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
70. Id. at 418, 420, 452. See also Mark B. Baker, The Western European Legal Response to Terror-
ism, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1987).
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The European Commission concluded that "[c]omplete sensory isolation
coupled with complete social isolation can no doubt ultimately destroy the per-
sonality."'" It was held that this would be inhuman treatment "which cannot be
justified by the requirements of security. 7 2 Nevertheless, the Commission re-
jected the complaint that the German suspects had been treated in this way. It
also rejected the complaints directed at the conduct of their trial.73
C. The Italian Cases
Terrorist actions in Italy also gave rise to proceedings in the European Court
that were concerned with the length of detention of terrorist suspects before
conviction and the conditions in which convicted terrorists could be held.
The kidnapping and murder of the former Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Aldo
Moro, in 1978 constituted the high water mark of terrorist activities in Italy. Re-
sponsibility for the death was claimed by the Red Brigade, a political group en-
gaged in numerous terrorist activities since 1972. The Italian legislature
increased the powers of police and permitted executive detention orders and
other measures. A challenge to such measures was brought in the European
Court by Mr. Michele Guzzardi. He was held on remand detention between
1973 and 1979. That detention was even continued despite Mr. Guzzardi's ac-
quittal in 1976 of the terrorist charges. His prolonged incarceration after this ac-
quittal was sustained by an executive order.
By majority, the European Court upheld the complaints. It rejected the at-
tempt of Italy to justify its detention of Mr. Guzzardi on an island off the coast
of Sardinia in a dilapidated prison.74 It found that Mr. Guzzardi was entitled to
compensation with regard to such detention. This entitlement was held to have
survived notwithstanding his later conviction, on appeal, of the offenses for
which he had been initially detained.
Subsequent proceedings upheld unanimously a later complaint by another
Italian prisoner concerning the censorship of his correspondence and conditions
71. Ensslin, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 456.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 468, 470.
74. See Guzzardi v. Italy, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 34-35 (1981).
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of his detention.75 The Court held that the law under which this conduct had oc-
curred allowed "too much latitude" to the state authorities.76
D. The Spanish Cases
A number of cases have also been brought from Spain to the European Court.
A significant part of the antiterrorism laws enacted in Spain after the death of
General Francisco Franco in 1975 was examined by the European Court in Bar-
berd v. Spain.77 That case concerned alleged members of the Catalan Peoples'
Army. In October 1980 a Catalan businessman had been murdered. The appli-
cants were detained because the crimes were characterized as terrorist acts. The
Spanish law in question permitted detention for up to ten days. A judicial order
could require that the detainee be kept incommunicado during judicial investiga-
tion and subject to communication interception. Access to a lawyer was denied
during the period of the incommunicado holding. Not until three months after
they were first detained were the applicants charged with murder, a crime for
which they were subsequently convicted and sentenced.
The applicants contended that they had been denied the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. Specifically, they complained about
the withdrawal of their right of access to a lawyer during the early stages of in-
vestigation. The European Court concluded that the proceedings did not satisfy
the requirements of a fair and public proceeding as contemplated by the Con-
vention.78 It found against Spain.
Later Spanish cases in the European Court have concerned the Basque Sep-
aratist Movement (ETA). This organization is the most active terrorist group in
Western Europe, having been linked to more than eight hundred deaths since
1968. 7' Following the events of September 11, 2001, the European Union ac-
ceded, in December 2001 and June 2003,80 to Spain's request officially to pro-
75. See Diana v. Italy, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1765.
76. Id. at 1775.
77. BarberA v. Spain, Apps. Nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 360 (1988).
78. See id. at 392.
79. See Kenneth Craig Dobson, The Spanish Government's Ban of a Political Party: A Violation of
Human Rights?, 9 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 637, 639 (2003).
80. See Council Regulation 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures
Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities With a View to Combating Terrorism, art. 2(3),
2001 O.J. (L 344) 70, 72, available at http://europa.eu.int; see also EU Blacklists Basque Party, BBC
News, June 5, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/2965260.stm.
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scribe ETA as a terrorist organization. Attempts were also made to ban the
political wing of ETA (Batasuna) as a political party. It was dissolved by order of
Spain's highest civil court. An appeal by the party to the Constitutional Court of
Spain was rejected in January 2004.
In November 2003, Batasuna filed a challenge in the European Court com-
plaining about this exclusion from the democratic process. It asserted that it vio-
lated the freedom of association expressed in Article 11 of the Convention. The
Court has accepted the case but has yet to rule on the issue.
Under the European Court's jurisprudence, the consideration of access of
political parties to the electoral process constitutes a fundamental principle in a
democracy." Nevertheless, some restrictions may be imposed on the broadcast
of live interviews with members of the political wings of terrorist organiza-
tions.8 2 The challenge by Batasuna will once again require the European Court
to walk a difficult path.83
The European Court has acknowledged the "margin of appreciation" be-
longing to the European States when they deal with terrorism. When the Stras-
bourg Court decides the Batasuna challenge, many will be watching to see
whether the "margin of appreciation" is broadened in this context following the
events of September 11, 2001 and the March 2004 terrorist attack on civilians in
Madrid. Getting the right balance in such matters is by no means easy. However,
in Europe, from the Atlantic coast of Ireland to the Pacific coast of Russia, a
great multinational court is setting standards that uphold human rights, the rule
of law, and democratic government in a way that commands respect. It is impor-
tant that national judges be aware of this jurisprudence. As the foregoing cases
demonstrate, many of the problems concerning legal responses to terrorists and
terrorism that have come before national courts in recent years have already
been analyzed in well-reasoned and detailed judicial opinions that are available
to help the judges of other lands who come later.
V. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TANZANIAN BOMBING
An early instance of the unwillingness of national courts to bend basic prin-
ciples in the face of accusations of terrorism was the decision of the Constitu-
81. See, e.g., United Communist Party v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8-10.
82. See Purcell v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89,70 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 262,265 (1991).
83. See Dobson, supra note 79, at 640-41.
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tional Court of South Africa in Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South
Africa 84
The case concerned Khalfan Mohamed who was wanted by the United States
on a number of capital charges relating to the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Em-
bassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998. The appellant had been in-
dicted in the United States. A warrant for his arrest was issued by a federal district
court. He had entered South Africa unlawfully as an alien. He was detained there
by the authorities acting in cooperation with U.S. officials. In his interrogation he
was not given the rights provided by South African law. The South African au-
thorities offered him a choice of deportation to Tanzania or the United States. He
preferred the latter but applied to the courts for an order that the government of
the United States be required to undertake that the death penalty would not be
sought, imposed, or carried out on him. That order was refused at first instance
and the appellant was deported. This notwithstanding, an application to the Con-
stitutional Court was pursued on his behalf on the footing that the appellant had
been denied the protection of South African constitutional law, under which it has
been held that capital punishment is contrary to constitutional guarantees.8 5
The Constitutional Court of South Africa held that Mr. Mohamed's depor-
tation was unlawful and that extradition, not deportation, was the applicable law.
Such remedy was required, under South African law, to be negotiated with the
requesting state under conditions obliging an assurance that the death penalty
would not be imposed following a conviction. In this respect, the court below,
and the government of South Africa, had failed to uphold a commitment im-
plicit in the Constitution of South Africa. It was held that there had been no
waiver by the accused in consenting to deportation to the United States.
Because Mr. Mohamed was, by the time of the Court's orders under trial be-
fore a U.S. federal court, it was outside the power of the Constitutional Court by
its orders to afford him physical protection. Nevertheless, the decision of the pri-
mary judge in South Africa was set aside. A declaration was made that the con-
stitutional rights of the appellant in South Africa had been infringed. The
Constitutional Court directed its chief officer, as a matter of urgency, to forward
the text of its decision to the U.S. court.8 6 Following the outcome of the trial in
84. Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) SALR 893, 921 (CC).
85. See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 401, 451 (CC).
86. Mohamed, 2001 (3) SALR 893 at 924 (CC).
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the United States, the appellant was convicted. However, he was not sentenced
to death. Whether this was due in any way to the South African intervention is
unknown. However, the South African court did what it could to uphold the ac-
cused's fundamental legal rights notwithstanding the charge of terrorist of-
fenses. The government officials were less respectful of those rights.
In July 2004, a somewhat similar application was before the same South
African court. An airplane had departed South Africa for Zimbabwe en route to
Equatorial Guinea. South African government officials alerted their counter-
parts in Harare about certain suspicions. The result was that the plane was
searched and a quantity of weapons was found. The alleged mercenaries were
arrested and brought before the courts of Zimbabwe. They resisted deportation
to Equatorial Guinea on the basis that, if convicted, they would be subject to the
death penalty. They also complained about the standards of the Guinean courts.
While this application was pending in Zimbabwe, the applicants also sought
relief in the Constitutional Court of South Africa. They alleged that the South
African officials had acted without regard to the applicants' rights under the
South African Constitution. They also asserted that, in the exercise of its inter-
national relations (and in any representations to be made to Zimbabwe and
Equatorial Guinea) the South African government was bound, by the language
of the Constitution, to take into account the requirements of the Constitution
obliging the state to defend, uphold, and protect the constitutional rights of
those within its protection.
The decision of the Constitutional Court in this case was delivered in Septem-
ber 2004. It included a limited finding of the South African Government's duty in
the case. In the course of argument, the court was reminded of the famous words
of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States,87 cited earlier in Mohamed:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be im-
perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously .... Government
is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. ... If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
88
87. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
88. Mohamed, 2001 (3) SALR 893 at 921 (CC).
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These last words have a special resonance in South Africa as the Constitu-
tional Court explained in Mohamed:
[W]e saw in the past what happens when the State bends the law
to its own ends and now, in the new era of constitutionality, we
may be tempted to use questionable measures in the war against
crime. The lesson becomes particularly important when dealing
with those who aim to destroy the system of government through
law by means of organised violence. The legitimacy of the consti-
tutional order is undermined rather than reinforced when the
State acts unlawfully.89
These words were written in May 2001, before the events of September 11 th
of that year. They remain true today and not only in South Africa.
VI. THE UNITED STATES AND GUANTXNAMO BAY
Probably the best known decision in this class of cases is that of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Rasul v. Bush."° That decision was delivered in June
2004. The Court was divided six to three. The opinion of the Court was written
by Justice Stevens. Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.
In the Court opinion, Justice Stevens cited the law authorizing President
Bush, after September 11, 2001, to use "all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons."9' In reliance on this law, the President established a detention
facility at the Naval Base at Guantlnamo Bay on land in Cuba leased by the
United States from the Republic of Cuba. Two Australians, Mamdouh Habib
and David Hicks, who were detained in the facility, together with others, filed
petitions in U.S. federal courts for writs of habeas corpus. They sought release
from custody, access to counsel, freedom from interrogation, and other relief.
89. Id.
90. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
91. Id. at 2690. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2a, 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001).
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The U.S. district court had dismissed these petitions for want of jurisdic-
tion. It relied on a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950.92 That decision
held that "[a]liens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States
[may not] invok[e] a petition for a writ of habeas corpus."9'3 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decision, and remanded the case. In effect, Justice
Stevens followed what he had earlier written in the Padilla case where he said:
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free soci-
ety. Even more important than the method of selecting the
people's rulers and their successors is the character of the con-
straints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law. Uncon-
strained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and
preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star
Chamber.... For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals
symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to
resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.
94
The decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush is reflec-
tive of similar notions. It traces the restraint on executive power in the United
States to legal and constitutional "fundamentals." It does so through the history of
the legal system which the United States shares with other common law countries.
As Lord Mansfield wrote in 1759, even if a territory was "no part
of the realm," there was "no doubt" as to the court's power to issue
writs of habeas corpus if the territory was "under the subjection of
the Crown."'95 Later cases confirmed that the reach of the writ de-
pended not on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather
on the practical question of "the exact extent and nature of the ju-
risdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the Crown.
96
92. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
93. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55,68 (D.D.C. 2002).
94. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that habeas corpus should be
available).
95. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2697 (quoting King v. Cowle (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 at 598-599 (K.B.)).
96. Id. (quoting Ex parte Mwenya (1960) 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (Eng. C.A.) (Lord Evershed M.R.)).
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The rule of law was upheld by the U.S. judges. Even in the face of executive
demands for exemption from court scrutiny because of the suggested exigencies
of alleged terrorism, the Supreme Court asserted the availability of judicial su-
pervision and the duty of judges to perform their functions, including on the ap-
plication of non-citizens. To say the least, the case is an extremely important one.
By rejecting the contention that the executive was not answerable in the
courts for the offshore detention by U.S. personnel of alleged terrorists, the Su-
preme Court of the United States gave an answer to the fear that the U.S. mili-
tary facility at Guantinamo Bay had become a "legal blackhole." That fear had
been expressed not only by civil libertarians, do-gooders, and the usual suspects.
It had been expressed by some of the most distinguished lawyers of our tradi-
tion, including Lord Steyn,97 Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Lord Goldsmith QC,
Attorney-General for the United Kingdom," and Sir Gerard Brennan, past
Chief Justice of Australia.99 Lord Goldsmith remarked on the duty of lawyers to
influence and guide the response of states and the international community to
terrorism:
The stakes could not be higher-loss of life and loss of liberty. The
UK government is committed to taking all necessary steps to pro-
tect its citizens. I am convinced that this can be done compatibly
with upholding the fundamental rights of all, including those ac-
cused of committing terrorist acts.100
VII. RECENT BRITISH SECURITY DECISIONS
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Rasul was only one of several
cases dealing with aspects of the response to terrorism. Such cases are beginning
to appear in many jurisdictions. The same determination to uphold the rule of
law can be witnessed in Commonwealth countries.
97. Johan Steyn, Guantdnamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1 (2004).
98. Lord Goldsmith, Terrorism and Individual Liberty: The Response of the State, INT'L BAR
NEWS, Dec. 2003 (edited version of an address at the International Bar Association 2003 confer-
ence in San Francisco).
99. See generally Gerard Brennan,Australia andthe Rule of Law, I AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 1,2-8 (2003)
(providing a detailed background of Guantinamo Bay).
100. Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 11.
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On March 18, 2004, the English Court of Appeal delivered its decision in
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M.' The judgment of the English
Court was given by Lord Chief Justice Woolf. The case was an application by
the Home Secretary for leave to appeal against a decision of the Special Immi-
gration Appeals Commission. That body had been established by the U.K. Par-
liament in response to an earlier decision of the European Court of Human
Rights."°2 The latter had criticized the procedures that existed under the legisla-
tion then in force to respond to terrorism in Northern Ireland.
The Special Commission is, by law, a superior court of record. Its members,
who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, must be judges who hold, or have
held, high judicial office. This provision was in place when the events of Sep-
tember 11,2001 occurred. Under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of
2001, the British Home Secretary has the power to issue a certificate with respect
to a person whose presence in the United Kingdom is deemed a "risk to national
security" or who is suspected to be a "terrorist.' ' 3 The Home Secretary, Mr.
David Blunkett, duly granted such a certificate in the case of M, a Libyan na-
tional present in the United Kingdom. M was taken into custody.
Early in March 2004, the Commission, presided over by Justice Collins, al-
lowed M's appeal against the Home Secretary's certificate. The Home Secretary
challenged this action that he saw as judicial interference in an essential political
and ministerial judgment. He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. He
complained that the Commission had reversed a decision for which he was ac-
countable in Parliament and to the electorate through the democratic process.
The Court of Appeal rejected the Home Secretary's application. It affirmed
the decision of the Commission. It described the role played by the "special ad-
vocate" under the arrangements established by the British Parliament for partic-
ipation of that advocate in the procedures of the Commission in such a case. The
aim of the office of "special advocate" is to make the attainment of justice more
achievable in a case where certain information cannot be disclosed to the accused
or the accused's lawyers because of the suggested interests of national security:
101. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M, 2004 H.R.L.R. 22 (Eng. C.A.).
102. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831 (1996); see also Secretary of State for the
Home Department v. M, 2004 H.R.L.R. 22, at 609 (Eng. C.A.). For a discussion of Chahal, see
LORD LESTER OF HERNE HILL QC & DAVID PANNICK QC, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE §§
4.5.33-.35, at 182-83 (2d ed. 2004).
103. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 21(1) (2001) (Eng.).
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The involvement of a special advocate is intended to reduce (it
cannot wholly eliminate) the unfairness which follows from the
fact that an appellant will be unaware at least as to part of the case
against him. Unlike the appellant's own lawyers, the special advo-
cate is under no duty to inform the appellant of secret informa-
tion. That is why he can be provided with closed material and
attend closed hearings. As this appeal illustrates, a special advo-
cate can play an important role in protecting an appellant's inter-
est before [the Commission]. He can seek ... information. He can
ensure that evidence before [the Commission] is tested on behalf
of the appellant. He can object to evidence and other information
being unnecessarily kept from the appellant. He can make sub-
missions to [the Commission] as to why the statutory require-
ments have not been complied with. In other words he can look
after the interests of the appellant, in so far as it is possible for this
to be done without informing the appellant of the case against
him and without taking direct instructions from the appellant.'O°
Ironically, the alleged terrorist, M, had refused to cooperate with the "spe-
cial advocate." Clearly, he thought that this was a typical British formality, de-
signed to do no more than to give a veneer of protection where none would in
fact be afforded. At the beginning of the proceedings before the Commission, M
indicated that he did not wish to take any part in them. However, he affirmed
that he was not involved in, nor did he support, acts of terrorism. It was then left
to the Commission's own procedures to scrutinize the decision of the Home Sec-
retary to contrary effect.
In the result, the Commission ruled against the Home Secretary. The Court
of Appeal, like the Commission, held part of its hearing in closed session. Only
part of its reasons were given on the record. The Commission insisted that the
suspicion of the Minister had to be a reasonable suspicion. It stated that the Min-
ister had failed to demonstrate error on the part of the Commission. In his con-
cluding remarks, Lord Chief Justice Woolf, for the Court of Appeal, said:
Having read the transcripts, we are impressed by the openness
and fairness with which the issues in closed session were dealt ....
104. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M, 2004 H.R.L.R. 22. at 612 (Eng. C.A.).
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We feel the case has additional importance because it does clearly
demonstrate that, while the procedures which [the Commission]
have to adopt are not ideal, it is possible by using special advocates
to ensure that those detained can achieve justice and it is wrong
therefore to undervalue the SIAC appeal process.... While the
need for society to protect itself against acts of terrorism today is
self-evident, it remains of the greatest importance that, in a society
which upholds the rule of law, if a person is detained as M was de-
tained, that individual should have access to an independent tri-
bunal or court which can adjudicate upon the question of whether
the detention is lawful or not. If it is not lawful, then he has to be
released. "
VIII. ISRAEL AND THE SECURITY FENCE
At about the same time as the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was
handed down, the Supreme Court of Israel, on May 2, 2004, delivered its deci-
sion upon a challenge brought on behalf of Palestinian complainants concerning
the "separation fence" or "security fence" being constructed through Palestinian
land."°6 This "fence" has been justified by the Government of Israel and the
Israeli Defense Force as essential to repel the terrorist (specifically suicide) at-
tacks against Israeli civilians and military personnel carried out from adjoining
Palestinian lands.
In defense of the security wall, the Israeli authorities pointed to the decline
in the number of such attacks following the creation of the barrier. It would not
have been entirely surprising if the Supreme Court of Israel had refused to be-
come involved in such a case, ruled the matter not justiciable in a court of law, or
105. Id. at 873.
106. Subsequently, the International Court ofJustice, on a reference from the General Assembly
of the United Nations, held that the construction of the wall or "fence" on Palestinian land was
contrary to international law. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) (unreported).
In the result, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to condemn the building of the
wall. Only 6 states voted against the resolution, including the United States, Israel, and Australia.
U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Special Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (2004).
See H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov't of Isr., 86 (2004) (unreported opinion by
Barak P. Mazza V.P. & Cheshin J., concurring).
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had said that it had no legal authority to deal with such an issue lying at the heart
of the responsibilities of the executive government for the defense of the nation.
However, from bitter experience, the Jewish people learned about the great
dangers of legal black holes. In Nazi Germany, the problem was not a lack of
law. Most of the actions of the Nazi State in Germany were carried out under de-
tailed laws made by established lawmakers. 7 The problems for the Jewish
people and other victims of the Third Reich arose from the pockets of official ac-
tivity that fell outside legal superintendence. These, truly, were "black holes."
It is evident that the Supreme Court of Israel was determined to avoid such
an absence of judicial supervision. The Court did not question the basic decision
of the executive to build the wall. However, applying what common law judges
would regard as principles of administrative law or of constitutional proportion-
ality, it upheld the complaints of the excessive way in which the wall had been
created in several areas. At the conclusion of his reasons, Justice Aharon Barak,
President of the Court, said:
Our task is difficult. We are members of Israeli society. Although
we are sometimes in an ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of
Jerusalem, which is not infrequently struck by ruthless terror. We
are aware of the killing and destruction wrought by terror against
the state and its citizens. As any other Israelis, we too recognize the
need to defend the country and its citizens against the wounds in-
flicted by terror. We are aware that in the short term, this judgment
will not make the state's struggle against those rising up against it
easier. But we are judges. When we sit in judgment, we are subject
to judgment. We act according to our best conscience and under-
standing. Regarding the state's struggle against the terror that rises
up against it, we are convinced that at the end of the day, a struggle
according to the law will strengthen her power and her spirit.
There is no security without law. Satisfying the provisions of the
law is an aspect of national security. [In] The Public Committee
against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 845 [1 said]:
107. Such as the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service 1933 (Germ.) and the Law
for the Protection of German Blood and Honor 1935 (Germ.). See discussion in Kartinyeri v. Com-
monwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337 at 415-17. Note the hortatory titles of these German laws: a prac-
tice that has spread.
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"We are aware that this decision does make it easier to deal with
that reality. This is the destiny of a democracy-she does not see
all means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not al-
ways open before her. A democracy must sometimes fight with
one arm tied behind her back. Even so, a democracy has the upper
hand. The rule of law and individual liberties constitute an im-
portant aspect of her security stance. At the end of the day, they
strengthen her spirit and this strength allows her to overcome her
difficulties."
That goes for this case as well. Only a Separation Fence built on a
base of law will grant security to the state and its citizens. Only a
separation route based on the path of law will lead the state to the
security so yearned for.I's
The Israeli Supreme Court accepted petitions in a number of cases holding
that the injury to the petitioners was disproportionate. It ordered relief and costs
in favor of those petitioners.
IX. INDONESIA AND THE BALI BOMBING
On July 24, 2004, the world awakened to the news that the Constitutional
Court of Indonesia had set aside the conviction imposed on Masykur Abdul
Kadir, convicted and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for helping Imam
Samudra in connection with the bombing in Bali on October 13, 2002. That
bombing killed 202 people, including 88 Australians.
The decision of the Indonesian Court was reached by majority, five Justices
to four. The problem arose out of the decision of the prosecutor to proceed
against the accused not on conventional charges of homicide or the crimes
equivalent to arson, conspiracy, or use of explosives, but instead to charge the
accused only under a special terrorism law introduced as a regulation six days
after the bombings in Bali."°
108. H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov't of Isr., 86 (2004) (unreported opinion
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The amended Indonesian Constitution contains basic principles protecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms. One of these principles, reflected in
many statements of human rights, is the prohibition on criminal legislation hav-
ing retroactive effect." ' As stated in the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, an exception is sometimes allowed
to permit trial or punishment "for any act or omission which, at the time when
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recog-
nised by civilised nations.""' This statement from the Convention is drawn di-
rectly from the statute of the International Court of Justice." 2
The decision of the Indonesian court was not wholly unexpected among
lawyers who were following the Bali trials. During the Bali hearings, the prob-
lem of retroactive punishment had been canvassed in the Australian media by
experts in Indonesian law. Yet if the Indonesian Constitution explicitly forbids
criminal punishment based on laws of retroactive operation, the decision was
not legally surprising, subject to any exceptions that may apply.
There would have been many reasons of an emotional and psychological kind
for the Indonesian judges to resist the accused Bali bombers' appeal to the prohibi-
tion against retroactive punishment. The evidence against the accused, demon-
strating their involvement in the bombings, was substantial and often uncontested.
The behavior of some of the accused in the presence of grieving relatives was pro-
vocative and unrepentant. The pain to the families of victims was intense. The
damage to the economy of Bali and Indonesia, caused by the bombings, was large.
The affront to the reputation of Indonesia was acute. In this sense, the case was a
severe test for judges of the Constitutional Court sworn to uphold the rule of law.
The rule of law is itself one of the fundamental principles which democrats,
the world over, defend against terrorists."3 As Chief Justice Latham once said in
110. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16,1966,
art. 15, para. 1,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7, para. 1, 1 European Conventions and Agreements 43,52
(1993). The sub-article is not derogable. See id. art. 15, para. 2.
111. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 7, para. 2.
112. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, International Court of Justice, at http'//
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
See LESTER & PANNICK,supra note 102, at 260.
113. In this respect, Mr. Duncan Kerr, MP in Opposition in Australia, supported the assertion by
Mr. Tony Abbott MP, in Government, that the defense of Western civilization will fail unless
leaders are prepared to uphold its values with the same passion as those who attack them. One of
the identified "values" was the rule of law. Kerr, supra note 42, at 134.
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an Australian case, it is easy for judges of constitutional courts to accord basic
rights to popular majorities."4 The real test comes when they are asked to accord
the same rights to unpopular minorities and individuals. The Indonesian case of
Masykur Abdul Kadir was such a test.
Other proceedings may now be brought against Mr. Kadir. Other convicted
accused, who have exhausted their rights of appeal, may have no further reme-
dies. Time will tell. But in the long run, the fundamental struggle against terror-
ism is strengthened, not weakened, by court decisions that insist on strict
adherence to the rule of law. This extends to accused who are innocent, or who
may be. It also extends to accused who are, or appear to be, guilty. It is in Indo-
nesia's interest, and that of the world, that the courts should enjoy (even in such
a case) a reputation for strict adherence to constitutionalism, the rule of law and
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This prolongs the
pain of many. But the alternative course is more painful for even more.
In a comment on the Indonesian court's decision, an Australian editorialist
said:
The Constitutional Court decision should be seen for what it is-
part of a proper legal process in which every person has the right
to exhaust all avenues of appeal. This is a positive development for
Indonesia. The ensuing legal uncertainty, and the inevitable stress
it will cause ... could and should have been avoided." 5
X. TRUE DEMOCRACY AND REAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Judges in every land can take reassurance from the pattern in the judicial
decisions that I have outlined. Of course, I make no comment on their correct-
ness. That is a matter for the courts concerned. All of them are decisions of high
judicial officers. But it is essential that strong decisions should be given at every
level of the judicial hierarchy of every country-upholding the rule of law even
in the age of terrorism.
The assertion of judicial superintendence of the legislature and the execu-
tive government is vital for the good health of liberty in every society. This is the
114. See Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth (Aust. 1943) 67 C.L.R. 116,
124.
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way it must be if we are not to lose our liberties in the struggle against terrorism
and its challenge to those same liberties. The rule of law and constitutionalism
must be preserved. Moreover, antiterrorist legislation itself must include protec-
tions such as those that were seen to work in the U.K. courts in the case of M.
Free citizens have a right to look to their legislators for proportionality and pro-
tection of the rule of law, not mere rhetoric and a bidding war in extreme mea-
sures. Unrestrained, unscrutinised governmental power is the path of tyranny.
This is the lesson of the history of the common law. We do well to remember it.
Judges must uphold that lesson in their deliberations in court and in their orders.
Throughout the world, there remain autocrats and nations that do not live
by the rule of law or respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In one of
the leading newspapers of the Asian region, an editorial commented on the
flurry of courtroom activity demonstrating that war has its legal limits, and the
rule of law still prevails." 6 Noting the successive decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Supreme Court of Israel and the appearance in the
dock in Baghdad of Saddam Hussein to face charges of war crimes and genocide
under conditions which he never granted to his enemies (a public trial and de-
fense by a lawyer of his choice) the editorialist observed:
The rule of law is alive and well .... There are those who say de-
mocracy is the free election of a government, but that is barely the
beginning. The true test of democracy is the accountability of
those privileged enough to serve the voters. Almost every nation
holds elections. Those that are truly democratic hold the elected
officials responsible for carrying out legal policy. In a world where
democracy has expanded rapidly in the past decade, this is not a
minor detail. Democracy is a legitimate, developmental weapon
that can stop and help to defeat terrorism. " 7
"[L]ike Mr Bush and Mr Sharon, the former dictator also will have to face a
court of law and account for his actions."'"18
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